Original edition:
We Fought them in Gunboats by Robert Hichens
Published by Michael Joseph, 1944

Later edition offered above:
We Fought them in Gunboats by Robert Hichens
Edited by David James
Published by John Spencer, 1957

We are offering for sale the later re-edited edition of this title. It is difficult to describe the differences briefly but the following comparative extracts might help.

The text in the left column is taken from the original 1944 edition and that in the right column is taken from the re-edited edition of 1957.

The opening paragraphs of the book are an example of where the later edition contains more factal details that put the narrative into context

The opening paragraphs.......

It was an autumn night at a Coastal Force base, H.M.S. Beehive. There was an early moon with a flat, calm, glassy winter's night. An ideal night for E-boats.

Rain or sun, cold or heat meant little to us. The weather was divided into operational or un-operational conditions. To-night these were perfect.

The 6th Motor Gun Boat Flotilla had been working hard. Still recovering from a holocaust of boats due to an air-sea rescue trip in late August in a hard wind, there were only four boats out of the eight operating at the time. These boats were well-armed, had a high speed and made a hell of a noise. Our job was to cover, or try to cover, the East Coast convoy route.

The opening paragraphs.......

It was the night of the 19th-20th November; 1941 at H.M.S. Beehive, a Coastal Force base. There was an early moon with a flat, calm, glassy winter's night. An ideal night for E-boats.

Rain or sun, cold or heat meant little to us, the weather was divided into operational or un-operational conditions. These were perfect.

The 6th Motor Gun Boat Flotilla had been working hard. Still recovering from a holocaust of boats due to an air-sea rescue trip in late August in a hard wind, there were only four boats out of the eight operating at the time. These boats were 70-ft. long, carrying a single 20-millimetre gun, an Oerlikon and two .5s in twin power-operated turrets on either side of the bridge, the "dustbin" as we called it. They had a speed of from 40-45 knots and made a hell of a noise. The 6th Flotilla was one of two flotillas of fast M.G.B.s covering, or trying to cover, the East Coast convoy route.

The restored censored paragraphs throughout the book usually contain fuller details of boat specifications, of tactics, of shortcomings in equipment or criticisms of senior officers and/or the naval procurement staff. The example below is taken from Chapter Four and shows the restoration of text completely omitted from the original edition.

As the re-constituted flotilla settled down, I introduced one other element in our communal life, which was to be a success and prove of value to us. It was known as "the tactical talk."

I was determined to formulate some clearly defined plans of attack and tactical dispositions. With this in view I decided to have a weekly meeting of all the officers in my flotilla, to discusss these matters and work out our schemes; and because originally our idea was to get at the correct form of tactics for our warfare, we called it the "tactical talk."

As the reconstituted flotilla settled down, I introduced one other element in our communal life, which was to be a success and prove of value, to us. It was known as "the tactical talk." It originated in this way.

Shortly before Howes had given up the flotilla, while 64 was still at Brightlingsea, there had been a slight disaster. A unit had gone to sea consisting of 62, 60 and 67. They were going over to the other side, 62 was leader. When nearing the Dutch coast they had suddenly come upon a small fishing boat under sail. They had closed at speed and 60, the nearside boat, getting excited, had forged ahead and opened fire. The leader, realising that here was no fair game for a gunboat, had called off his ships and ordered them to follow him, at the same time turning away to starboard. In the resulting confusion 67 had rammed 62 severely, knocking in her bow to a distance of several feet and damaging her so seriously that she rapidly filled with water and had to be abandoned. Her crew were taken off and she was sunk by gunfire. Such accidents may inevitably happen when operating fast boats at night in war conditions, with no lights and often in the presence of the enemy. But in this case I considered that the accident was largely due to the fact that there had been no pre-arranged plan for dealing with the eventuality that had arisen, namely the discovery of a small and inoffensive fishing vessel. Sixty had been too hasty in attacking, and had thereby caused the confusion, she could not be censured however as everything was left to the initiative of the C.O., and he could justly claim that he was exercising his initiative, albeit somewhat mistakenly.

I had always been of the opinion that a mistake was being made in not having pre-arranged plans for dealing with different situations. Hard and fast rules could not be laid down, but the best method of attempting to deal with the various types of enemy craft that might be met could be discussed and postulated, and the different C.O.s would then at least know upon what lines the leader would probably be thinking.

I was determined to formulate some clearly defined plans of attack and tactical dispositions. With this in view I decided to have a weekly meeting of all the officers in my flotilla, to discuss these matters and work out our schemes, and because originally our idea was to get at the correct form of tactics for our warfare, we called it the "tactical talk."

The above are both minor examples of the differences between the two editions. The approximate word count of the earlier, censored, edition is 57,000. The approximate word count of the later edition is 74,000 which gives an idea of the amount of restoration of the text of the original manuscript.